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Mackenzie: Windfalls for Bankrupts: The Need for Legislation
NOTES

WINDFALLS FOR BANKRUPTS: THE NEED
FOR LEGISLATION
The whole policy of the Bankruptcy Act is that all nonexempt
property of the bankrupt shall be subject to the payment of his debts.'
This policy has been restricted by recent federal judicial decisions
that have found that Congress failed to arm the act with language
sufficient to police every situation that can arise. The bankruptcy
court may have the discretion of a court of equity, but some of the
federal judges have placed what may be undue emphasis on the fact
that the court's jurisdiction to act is derived wholly from the bankruptcy law. 2 It is the purpose of this note to point out for correction
a deficiency in the Bankruptcy Act that allows a bankrupt to obtain a
windfall to the detriment of his creditors. The windfall is a direct
result of judicial reluctance to act in this area unless Congress has
provided the precise authority.
Of primary concern to this discussion is a portion of section 70 of
3
the Bankruptcy Act:
(a) The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt... shall in turn be
vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of
the date of the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding
under this title . . . to all of the following kinds of property wherever located . . . (5) property, including rights of
action, which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any
means have transferred or which might have been levied upon
and sold under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized,
impounded, or sequestered.
Except for three specific types of property or property rights that
might accrue to the bankrupt after the petition in bankruptcy is filed,4
title to after-acquired property does not pass to the trustee. 5
1. In re Segal, 221 F. Supp. 282, (N.D. Tex. 1963); In re Dorgan's Estate, 237
Fed. 507 (S.D. Iowa 1916).
2. In re Ross Sand & Gravel, Inc., 289 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1961); In re Stearns
& White Co., 295 Fed. 833 (7th Cir. 1924). But see SEC v. United States Realty &
Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940); In re Barnett, 124 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.
1942).
3. 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §110(a)(5) (1958). Section
70(a)(5) describes the most comprehensive class of property that vests in the
trustee. 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 170.15 (14th ed. 1962).
4. See text accompanying note 53 infra.

5. In re Judson, 192 Fed. 834 (2d Cir. 1912), af'd sub noma., Everett v.
Judson, 228 U.S. 474 (1913); In re Burka, 104 Fed. 326 (E.D. Mo. 1900); Bloomer v.
Southwest Wash. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 36 Wash. 2d 752, 220 P.2d 324 (1950). See
also 4 CoLLiR, BANKRUPTCY, op. cit. supra note 3, 1170.09. But the after-acquired
property may not be free from all claims. The federal statutory lien for taxes
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The problem presented herein arises from the interplay of section
70 with section 172 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.6 Under
the provisions of section 172, which were enacted many years after
the provisions of section 70,7 a taxpayer who sustains a net operating
loss for his taxable year may utilize that loss as a deduction from gross
income for the three preceding and five succeeding taxable years.
Internal Revenue Code section 64118 assists a taxpayer who is suffering from business losses by providing him with immediate funds that
he may obtain through a tentative refund within ninety days of an
application for a section 172 carry-back adjustment.
Consider the following fact situation that is similar to those giving
rise to three main cases9 to be discussed later: a taxpayer who has in
previous years paid income taxes resulting from profitable operations
suffers heavy losses in a subsequent taxable year defined by code
section 172; he then files a voluntary petition in bankruptcy in the
taxable year of the losses; and, after the tax year has closed, he applies
for and obtains a tax refund in the nature of a tentative carry-back
adjustment for the preceding profitable years, based on the net operating loss in the year in which the bankruptcy petition is filed. The
problem is whether, on the date of filing of the bankruptcy petition,
the title to the prospective refund claim is such "property" of the
bankrupt as will vest in the trustee pursuant to section 70 and may be
used for the benefit of creditors when the claim is paid, or whether
it is after-acquired property, title to which vests in the bankrupt. If
title to the potential refund claim is not considered property and
does not vest in the trustee, the bankrupt gains a windfall. This windfall is an inequity to his creditors because the very losses that gave
rise to the bankrupt's inability to pay his creditors will produce the
claim for a carry-back refund that cannot be reached by the creditors.
SUMMARY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS

In re Sussman,10 a case of first impression on the windfall problem,
involved a situation in which the bankrupt suffered heavy losses in the
early months of 1956. He had filed returns and paid income taxes for
attaches to the after-acquired property. Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S.
265 (1945); Salsbury Motors v. United States, 210 F.2d 171 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,

347 U.S. 953 (1954).
6.

INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §172 (b) (1).

7. See authorities cited note 3 supra; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 247, §§23 (s),
122, 53 Stat. 867.
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6411 (b).
9. Segal v. Rochelle, 336 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1964); Fournier v. Rosenblum, 318
F.2d 525 (Ist Cir. 1963); In re Sussman, 289 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1961).
10. 289 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1961).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol17/iss2/5

2

Mackenzie: Windfalls for Bankrupts: The Need for Legislation
1964]

NOTES

the calendar years of 1954 and 1955. The bankrupt filed a petition in
bankruptcy on June 7, 1956, and the trustee in bankruptcy in March
1957 filed an application on behalf of the bankrupt, although without
his consent, for a tentative loss carry-back adjustment refund for the
years 1954 and 1955 as justified by the bankrupt's demonstrated substantial net operating loss for the calendar year of 1956. After the claim
was allowed in July 1957, and a refund check was delivered to the trustee, the bankrupt obtained an order from the referee directing the trustee to surrender the refund to the bankrupt. The referee's decision was
affirmed by the district court. 1' The Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
in affirming the district court's decision, determined that as of June
7, 1956, a date prior to the end of the bankrupt's taxable year, the
taxpayer had only an exp&ctancy of a loss carry-back refund that did
not fall within the "property" provision of the Bankruptcy Act,
section 70 (a) (5). The court reasoned that a loss carry-back refund
daim can only be defined in terms of a specific unit of time, the
taxable year, which had not elapsed at the time of filing of the bankruptcy petition; thus, there was no certainly that such a claim existed
until the end of the taxable year. The court's rationale is rather
difficult to criticize from the standpoint of what the law is, but is
subject to criticism from the standpoint of what the law ought to
be.1 2 The court gave an alternative ground for its result: whatever
the bankrupt had, property or expectancy, was not transferable or
assignable under the Assignment of Claims Act, 3 more popularly
known as the "anti-assignment statute," because the claim had not
yet been allowed by the federal government. This alternative ground
has been criticized and seems to be an incorrect determination. 4 It is
appropriate to note here that section 70 (a) (5) prescribes a dual test.
In order for an interest to vest in the trustee for the benefit of creditors, the bankrupt must have "property," and it must be property
"which prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means have
transferred or which might have been levied upon ....
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in Fournierv. Rosenblum,15 a
case said by the court to be "on all fours" with Sussman, reached the
same result as Sussman, but found it unnecessary to consider whether
11. In re Sussman, 188 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
12. See 14 STAN. L. Rliv. 380 (1962); 42 TExAS L. REv. 542 (1964).
13. 10 Stat. 170 (1853), as amended, 31 U.S.C. §203 (1958). This statute,
popularly known as the "anti-assignment statute," provides that claims against
the federal government cannot be assigned except "in the presence of two attesting
witnesses, after the allowance of such a claim, the ascertainment of the amount due,
and the issuing of a warrant for the payment thereof."
14. See comments cited note 12 supra.
15. 318 F.2d 525 (Ist Cir. 1963). The court stated: "it cannot be said that
a bankrupt's losses create a right to a carryback as soon as they occur, even though

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1964

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1964], Art. 5

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XVII

the earlier decision properly applied the assignability test. Summarizing the two cases, Sussman determined that neither the property test
nor the assignability test was met, and Fournier determined that
the property test was not met, so that consideration of the transferability or assignability test was not necessary.
The bankrupt was denied a windfall in the third major case of
Segal v. Rochelle.16 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's decision'7 that the Sussman opinion incorrectly applied
both tests of section 70 (a) (5). An analysis of the Segal court's opinion
leads to the conclusion that the crux of the entire problem is whether
there is any property subject to an assignment. Only after a claim
for a carry-back refund is determined to be property does the question
of its assignability arise. Also, the Sussman court's decision on assignability is much easier to prove incorrect by an examination of the
authorities than is that court's decision that a prospective claim for refund for federal income taxes is a mere expectancy, not property.
The three cases above illustrate the specific problem of a loss
carry-back windfall to a bankrupt. Consideration of the case of Palmer
v. Travelers Insurance Co. 8 aids in placing the problem of the operating loss windfall in a more general perspective. In that case, the
trustee in bankruptcy petitioned the court to allow him to proceed
against the bankrupt's insurance carrier for negligent failure to
settle an action resulting in a large judgment against the bankrupt.
The judgment resulted in the debtor's insolvency and he found it
necessary to file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy on July 21, 1960.
The referee's finding, which was affirmed by the district court, was
that under Texas law the judgment against the bankrupt did not become final any earlier than thirty days after February 27, 1962, and
that finality of action was a prerequisite to maintaining an action
against an insurer for negligent failure to settle. Thus, no right of
action against the insurance carrier existed on the date of filing of
the bankruptcy petition, and therefore, no right of action had vested
in the trustee under section 70 (a) (5). The bankruptcy court was reversed by the Fifth Circuit on other grounds not relevant here, but
the important point is that a situation may arise that is analogous to
the operating loss carry-back windfall. Should such a situation arise
in the First and Third Circuits, they may be inclined to allow a
the right be unenforceable until the end of the bankrupt taxpayer's accounting
period, for it is evident that a taxpayer who sustains a net operating loss for a
portion of his taxable year may earn or acquire, as by winning a large bet or
holding a winning sweepstakes ticket, enough income during the balance of the
year to offset or reduce his loss." Id. at 527.
16. 336 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1964).
17. In re Segal, 221 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Tex. 1963).
18. 319 F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1963).
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windfall by finding that a valuable right of a bankrupt is only an
expectancy and thus continue their narrow interpretation of the
statutory definition of property. The Palmer court's dictum indicated
that it would not be reluctant to act even though Congress had not
provided the precise authority, and this indication later became a
reality in the court's Segal decision.
Because of technical reasons, for example, the delay involved before
a judgment becomes final under state law, creditors may be deprived
of valuable rights because those rights are not considered property
at the time the petition is filed. Both the Palmer and carry-back refund cases involve a situation that can result in a loss to creditors, and
a gain to the bankrupt. This situation occurs despite the resulting
inequity that witnesses the bankrupt benefiting from the very circumstance, for example, operating losses or a financially crippling judgment, that causes the bankruptcy fixation of his creditors' rights at
a certain point in time. Unfortunately, those rights do not include
the ability to reach the particular property acquired by the bankrupt
after their rights are determined by the bankrupt's wise choice of
time for filing the bankruptcy petition. The situation is one that can
be characterized, except of course for considerations that diminish the
attractiveness of bankruptcy, as a way to fix creditors' rights by bankruptcy, and, at the same time, as a way to recoup by the windfall a
fund with which a bankrupt may begin a new financial life.
THE Two TEsTs

OF SECTION

70 (a) (5)

The Transferability Test
The section 70 (a) (5) test of transferability or assignability can be
met by a potential loss carry-back claim for a refund. If the potential
claim is a contingent property interest, as found in Segal, it is said to
be assignable at common law.19 Most contingencies may be assigned
in equity if the assignee has paid valuable consideration.20 Assignments enforceable in equity under state law are proper transfers for
the purposes of section 70 (a) (5).21 State law as to transferability of
22
particular property will ordinarily be followed in the federal courts,
but federal law determines whether the transferability test of section
70 (a) (5) is met.23 The assignability of an unsettled claim against the
19. In re Landis, 41 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1930); In re Wright, 157 Fed. 544 (2d
Cir. 1907); see 6 Am. Ju. 2d Assignments §8 (1963); 6 CJ.S. Assignments §12

(1937).
20. In re Landis, 41 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1930).
21. Id. at 703.

22. Ibid. See also Adelman v. Centaur Corp., 145 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1944).
23. In re Landis, 41 F.2d 700, 703 (7th Cir. 1930).
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United States Government for a tax refund is a matter covered by
2 4

federal legislation.

The only obstacle to transferability of the tax refund claim is the
anti-assignment statute. A key to the solution of the assignability
problem is an understanding of whether the anti-assignment statute
contemplates prohibition of a transfer that vests title to the bankrupt's property in the trustee; the correct conclusion should be that
it does not. It is well settled that the anti-assignment statute does not
apply to assignments arising from operation of law.25 This is true
whether the assignment is asserted against the United States or merely
among the parties. 26 The point was well stated in Chandler v. Nathans27 that the right to a tax refund is not actually assigned to the
trustee; the trustee exercises the right not as an assignee, but as one
to whom the right has passed by operation of the bankruptcy law.
In Erwin v. United States,28 a case decided before adoption of the
present Bankruptcy Act, the Supreme Court permitted title to an unsettled claim against the Government to vest in the trustee in bankruptcy despite the anti-assignment statute. The Court stated that
the statute applies only to cases of voluntary assignment of claims
against the Government, and does not apply to transfer of title by
operation of law. Although the provisions now embodied in section
70 (a) (5) were first enacted in 1898, there is apparently no authority
for a conclusion that the Erwin decision was to be changed.
The distinction between assignability and vesting of title to a
claim against the Government in the trustee was drawn in the case
of National Bank v. Downie.2 The Supreme Court decided that the
claim in question passed to the trustee in bankruptcy rather than to
a voluntary assignee who was precluded by the anti-assignment
statute from receiving a valid assignment. The Downie decision on
the point of voluntary assignment, as will be further discussed, seems
to be incorrect. It is clearly support, however, for the proposition
that the anti-assignment statute does not prohibit the vesting of
title in the trustee to an unsettled claim against the Government.
Assuming that the anti-assignment statute does not prohibit the
transfer of the carry-back refund claim by operation of law, is it an
obstacle to an assignment by operation of a contract? Again the conclusion should be that it is not. The assignability of a potential
24.

See 10 Stat. 170 (1853), as amended, 31 U.S.C. §203 (1958).

25. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 460, 479 (1950).
26. Ibid.
27. 6 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1925). The Chandler case was distinguished by Sussman
because Chandler involved a refund claim that the bankrupt could have presented
at the time the petition was filed.

28. 97 U.S. 392 (1878).
29. 218 U.S. 345 (1910).
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loss carry-back refund claim was considered in the Segal case. The
Segal court held that the potential refund was assignable despite the
anti-assignment statute. The rationale of the United States Supreme
Court decision in Martin v. National Surety Co.30 was a persuasive
precedent for the Segal decision. In the Martin case it was held that
the purpose of the anti-assignment statute was to protect the Government from becoming embroiled in conflicting claims, with accompanying delay and possibility of multiple liability, and not to regulate the
relationship of the parties to an assignment. This seems to be a desirable result. There is no apparent reason to read the statute in
such a way as to deny effect to an assignment between the parties
when the Government can invoke the statute and treat an assignment as void if the assignee attempts to recover from the Government. 3'
The Segal court distinguished Martin from Matter of Ideal Mercantile Corp.,32 which the Sussman court relied on as authority for the
rule that a loss carry-back claim was not transferable. The distinction was based on the fact that the Ideal court did not say that assignment of an unsettled claim against the Government is completely
void. Although the Segal court distinguished Martin from Ideal, the
final results of the two cases seem to be directly conflicting. This
permits freedom to choose the Martin interpretation of the antiassignment statute rather than the interpretation of the Ideal case
and the earlier Downie case. Downie held that assignment of an unallowed claim against the Government is absolutely void and does
not pass to the assignees any interest, present or remote, legal or
equitable.
The Ideal case followed the Downie theory in reaching a decision
that was based on a literal reading of the anti-assignment statute.
Ideal held that the assignment of an unsettled claim against the
Government passes no interest to the assignee prior to payment of
the claim, and a transfer is not perfected by being made in a manner
that would prevent it from being a voidable preference under section
60 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act. 33 Ideal did not consider the meaning
of transferability under section 70 (a) (5), and the court did not suggest that the assignee could not have enforced his assignment once the
claim had been paid by the Government. Therefore, Segal chose to
follow the Martin emphasis on the purpose of the anti-assignment
30. 300 U.S. 588 (1937). See also Bank of Cal. v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 428
(9th Cir. 1943); California Bank v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 129 F.2d 751
(9th Cir. 1942); In re Goodson, 208 F. Supp. 837 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
31. Wooten v. United States, 114 Ct. CI. 608, 86 F. Supp. 143, cert. denied,
339 U.S. 903 (1950).
32. 244 F.2d 828 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 856 (1957).
33. 52 Stat. 869 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §96 (a) (1958).
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statute rather than the Downie and Ideal emphasis on the literal
interpretation of the statute.
Under the Martin rationale, an interest in a loss carry-back refund
can validly be assigned prior to the end of the taxable year even
though the assignment would be unenforceable between the parties
until the claim is paid. The assignment of the future and contingent
interest is enforceable in equity in a dispute between the assignor and
assignee over the proceeds of the claim. The Government is in need
of no protection at that point in time, because its liability has been
discharged by the payment. A significant feature of the Martin theory,
in addition to allowing recognition of an assignment as between the
parties, is that since an assignment will be enforceable between the
parties when the claim is paid, it follows that the assignee has had inchoate rights since the time the assignment was made. By implication,
then, the Martin decision lends credence to the theory discussed below
that an unsettled claim against the Government is property, and not
merely an expectancy.
It should not be overlooked that section 70 (a) (5) of the Bankruptcy Act also will allow title to the bankrupt's property to vest in
the trustee when it "might have been levied upon and sold." In this
instance it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the matter of levy
is not covered by federal legislation, because the anti-assignment
statute does not prevent a state court levy upon or seizure of an unsettled claim against the Government. 3' Therefore, vesting of title in
the trustee would depend upon whether the law of a particular state
holds contingent interests subject to execution. 3 5 Such a conclusion
would mean that the Government is not protected under the antiassignment statute when it has not yet been determined under state
law whether a claim against the Government is subject to levy. But
the language of section 70 (a) (5) regarding the levy test, that might
be undesirable from the Government's point of view, can be eliminated
as surplusage if it is found, as it was in the Fifth Circuit's Segal decision, that an unsettled refund claim is a contingent property interest, the assignment of which is not restricted by the anti-assignment
statute.3 6 The Segal decision broadens the property concept to the
extent necessary to carry out the policy of the Bankruptcy Act that
subjects nonexempt property to payment of a bankrupt's debts.
34. United States v. Borcherling, 185 U.S. 223 (1902). See also Annot., 12
A.L.R.2d 460 (1950).
35. See Ragan v. Looney, 377 S.W.2d 273 (Mo. 1964); In re Packer's Estate, 246
Pa. 116, 92 Atl. 70 (1914); Glenney v. Crane, 352 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
1961).
36. It has been suggested that since the Treasury would never know whether
it should pay a claim to a bankrupt or the trustee until some court had determined
whether the claim was or was not capable of being levied upon in a particular
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The Property Test
It may reasonably be stated that the obstacle presented by the
anti-assignment statute to vesting title to an unallowed claim in the
trustee is surmountable. The Segal court, however, was forced to
struggle with analogies in order to find that the potential carry-back
refund claim is "property" that will vest in the trustee. The case of
Williams v. Heard37 is apparently the best analogy. This 1891 case
held that the bankrupts had at the time of bankruptcy, a possibility
of recovery coupled with an interest in extra insurance premiums that
had been paid to cover war risks created by Confederate ships sponsored by Great Britain. As the result of an 1871 reparations award
from Great Britain, Congress established in 1874 a commission to
determine the proper distribution of the fund. The bankruptcy occurred in 1875 and the bankrupts were discharged in 1877. Congress
provided in 1882 for an award of recovery of the extra premiums
paid and the question arose whether the bankrupts or their assignee
should be entitled to the award. It was held that, within the meaning of the act, such "property" had passed to the assignee of the
bankrupts. Reasoning by means of analogy, the Fifth Circuit stated
in the Segal decision that the right to a carry-back adjustment is
definite, the time for filing the claim is definite, and the amount of
the refund is contingent. This more than meets the Williams v. Heard
test of a possibility coupled with an interest. 38 The interest of the taxpayer is created by concluding that prior income taxes were paid
subject to the right of adjustment in the event of future losses. 39 The
theory is that when the taxpayer remits his income tax, he has a right
to a loss carry-back refund, subject to divestment, if the statutory
period of tax years passes without a loss.
jurisdiction, it would be better to ignore the literal terms of §70 (a) (5) and to hold
that the section does not deny such claims to the trustee because it obviously was
not intended to exclude them. 14 STAN. L. Rlv. 280, 385 (1962).
37. 140 U.S. 529 (1891). The bankruptcy statute at the time of this case
provided that all of the "estate, debts, and effects" of the bankrupt were to be
used for payment of creditors.
38. The court found nothing unusual about the fact that the taxpayer cannot
file for a refund until the end of the taxable year. Such filing was analogized to
the "every day occurrence where notes due and accounts receivable at a future date
pass to the trustee in bankruptcy." Segal v. Rochelle, 336 F.2d 298, 302 n.5 (5th
Cir. 1964).
39. *id. at 302. In the case of Kleinschmidt v. Schroeter, 94 F.2d 707 (9th Cir.
1938), the bankrupt's interest was established by his partial contribution to a
joint mining venture; he defaulted on the remaining contribution due from him.
The joint venture agreement provided that he forfeited all interest in the venture
except that he could have his contribution returned if the venture made a profit
or was sold at a profit. The conditional right of return was held vested in the
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The Segal court seems to have embraced the theory of a vested
property right subject to divestment, as evidenced by its citation of
In re Dorgan'sEstate.40 In the Dorgan case, a testator's will gave his
wife a life estate with remainder, if any, to his nieces and nephews.
One nephew filed his bankruptcy petition during the lifetime of the
widow. Under Iowa law, the will gave the bankrupt title to a vested
remainder subject to divestment. The court held that the bankrupt's
interest passed to the trustee. Although the bankrupt's interest was
a contingent property right, which could be completely defeated, the
court stated that it was, nevertheless, a property right that may be
valued through approximation by taking into account the age of the
widow and the prospective necessities of her life.
It should be noted here that a fairly accurate apportionment at
the end of the tax year could be utilized with respect to a loss carryback claim, whereas approximation is necessary in the case of the
widow, who may live one, a few, or many years after bankruptcy. Apportionment by a proposed statutory amendment, 41 or perhaps by the
judiciary, would limit the trustee's title to that part of the refund that
is proportionate to the part of the net operating loss for the taxable
year that is sustained prior to bankruptcy. Most discharges are
normally granted seven months or more after the filing of the petition
because creditors are given six months from the first meeting of
creditors in which to file their claims 42 and the first meeting of the
creditors is to be scheduled within ten to thirty days after adjudication
of bankruptcy, 43 which, in the case of a voluntary petition, is effected
upon filing. 4 Apportionment could delay a bankrupt's discharge for
seven or eight months beyond this normal time for discharge. For
example, if a taxpayer on a calendar year basis, filed a bankruptcy
petition on January 2, one day less than twelve months would pass
until the end of the taxable year arrived at which time losses could
be determined 45 and a claim for refund filed. The period from the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy to the final discharge would total
fifteen months upon the addition of the ninety-day period allowed
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue by code section 6411,46 in
trustee under §70 (a).
40. 237 Fed. 507 (S.D. Iowa 1916).
41. See 110 U. PA. L. REv. 275 (1961).
42. Bankruptcy Act §57 (in), 52 Stat. 867 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §93 (n)
(1958).
43. Bankruptcy Act §55, 52 Stat. 867 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §91 (a)
(1958).
44. Bankruptcy Act §14, 73 Stat. 109 (1959), 11 U.S.C. §41 (f) (Supp. V 1964).
45. A longer delay would result when the bankrupt's activities are so complicated that additional time must be allowed in order to adjust and close out
his accounting records.
46.

INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §6411 (b).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol17/iss2/5

10

1964]

Mackenzie: Windfalls for Bankrupts: The Need for Legislation
NOTES

which ninety-day period a determination is made whether a tentative
refund will be paid. Under an apportionment arrangement, as suggested by the Segal court, the bankrupt's earnings after the filing date
of the petition would simply reduce the amount of the current year's
losses and consequently reduce the amount of the refund to the
trustee.
The broad statement that it is possible to have an existing interest
in property without having an immediate right to enjoy the property
should counter the basic argument, that the prospective refund claim
is only an expectancy, asserted in the Sussman and Fournierdecisions.
At first blush, Justice Story's "inheritance test" might seem applicable
in the determination whether an inchoate claim is sufficiently in
existence in order to vest title in the trustee. Story's test, relied upon
in Williams, was set out in Comegys v. Vasse 4 7 and seeks an answer
to the question whether upon death the claim would pass to the
claimant's administrator. The inheritance test has been used in cases
arising under the present Bankruptcy Act, 48 but is of no use as applied

to a loss carry-back refund claim because the taxable year ends with
death,49 thereby converting the contingent nature of the claim so
that the claim passing to the administrator is fixed and not dependent
on any contingency. The district court, 50 which heard the Segal case,
suggested the inheritance test, but the Fifth Circuit properly failed
to mention it in its decision. The district court also cited dictum from
In re Baudouine5l for authority that section 70 (a) should be broadly
construed so that the trustee would not be deprived of any valuable
interest belonging to the bankrupt. That language may be dictum,
but it accurately describes the view taken by the district court and
the Fifth Circuit in the Segal case.
Prior to 1988, Congress was similarly faced with the possibility
that the bankrupt would obtain windfalls through the narrow interpretation of the statutory language of section 70 (a). The windfalls
would have allowed the bankrupt to withhold and prevent title to certain after-acquired property from vesting in the trustee for the benefit

47. 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 193 (1828).
48. In re Brown, 4 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1924); In re Evans, 253 Fed. 276 (W.D.
Tenn. 1918). See also Blagge v. Balch, 162 U.S. 439 (1896); Harlan v. Archer, 79
F.2d 673 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 656 (1935). In the latter two cases the
inheritance test was apparently acceptable, but the mere hope that Congress
would give the bankrupt a future reward or donation was held too contingent
to vest in the trustee.
49. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §443 (a) (2).
50. In re Segal, 221 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Tex. 1963).
51. 96 Fed. 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1899), revd on other grounds, 101 Fed. 574 (2d
Cir. 1900).
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of creditors. 52 Section 70 was amended by the Chandler Act of 193853
in order to prohibit these types of windfalls and make it impossible
for the bankrupt to withhold from the estate three kinds of property
or property rights that might accrue to him after the petition in bankruptcy was filed: (1) contingent interests in real estate that are not
transferable at the time of bankruptcy, but which become assignable
by the bankrupt within six months after bankruptcy;5 4 (2) title to bequests, devises and inheritances that vest in the bankrupt within six
months after bankruptcy; (3) title to property held in an estate by
the entirety that is vested in the bankrupt and another at the time
of bankruptcy, and which, within six months thereafter, becomes
transferable by the bankrupt alone. 55 With the exception that the
taxable year must be considered, rather than a period of six months,
there is no reason why Congress could not similarly amend section 70
to eliminate the loss carry-back windfall.
That the decisions rendered by the First and Third Circuits on
the carry-back refund problem differ from that of the Fifth Circuit
bears evidence that the "property" line is sometimes hard to draw.
The Sussman and Fourniercourts decided that the prospective refund
claim is a mere expectancy. 56 On the other hand, vested interests subject to complete divestment,5 7 contingent interests," s and possibilities
coupled with an interest 9 do vest in the trustee under section
70 (a) (5). It was fairly obvious that the Segal court strained to find
a property interest through the use of prior case law, but the finding
is certainly reasonable. The Sussman and Fournier findings of an
expectancy likewise were difficult to base upon strong authority.
Where and how should the "property" line be drawn?

52. In In re Swift, 259 Fed. 612 (N.D. Ga. 1919), allegations were made that
Swift fraudulently filed a petition in bankruptcy in order to withhold an imminent
inheritance (from his mother who died about ten days after the petition was
filed) from the trustee, who could not reach what the court considered afteracquired property; a petition to set aside Swift's adjudication as a bankrupt was
dismissed.
53. 52 Stat. 879 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §110(a) (1958).
54. See In re Baker, 13 F.2d 707 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 733 (1926).
55. See Dioguardi v. Curran, 35 F.2d 431 (4th Cir. 1929). The bankrupt might
subsequently be able to transfer the property by right of survivorship.
56. Similarly, in In re Baker, 13 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1926), an apparent heir's
expectancy was held just that, and not property, though the interest was transferable.
57. Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924).
58. Horton v. Moore, 110 F.2d 189 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 692
(1940); In re Dorgan's Estate, 237 Fed. 507 (S.D. Iowa 1916).
59. Kleinschmidt v. Schroeter, 94 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1938).
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AiENDMENT

Congress could better define the term "property" as used in section
70 (a) (5) by emphasizing what already should be manifest - that the
creditor should not be deprived of valuable rights belonging to the
bankrupt at the time of bankruptcy. Perhaps Congress intended to
rely in large part on the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion to define precisely the term "property." But such an intention
cannot reasonably be imputed to Congress in view of the obvious
attempt of section 70 to vest in the trustee every species of property
not legally exempt. 60 The windfall-eliminating Chandler Act evidences a legislative trend toward broadening section 70 (a) in order
to further the policy of the Bankruptcy Act, which is the orderly
61
distribution of the bankrupt's nonexempt property.
The Fifth Circuit's Segal decision is in harmony with the purpose
of the Bankruptcy Act, but the act should be amended to correct the
state of the law in the First and Third Circuits. Inclusion of a prospective loss carry-back claim in the section 70 (a) definition of those
assets that pass to the trustee would not only be a corrective amendment, it would also dearly indicate congressional intent that is more
in keeping with the purpose of the act. Title to valuable rights of
the bankrupt, though perhaps not technically "property" according
to the view of some judges, should vest in the trustee for the benefit
of creditors rather than become a windfall to the bankrupt at the
expense of his creditors.
One suggested amendment would insert the following language in
2
section 70 (a):6
The trustee shall be vested with title to such tax refund claims
as may be vested in the bankrupt at the time of the filing of
the petition, or as may vest in the bankrupt subsequent
to the filing of the petition provided that such subsequently
arising claims shall be due to losses incurred by the bankrupt
during the tax year in which the petition is filed.

60. In re Baudouine, supra note 51, at 540.
61. Sampsell v. Imperial Paper 9- Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941); In re Segal,
221 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Tex. 1963).
62. See 16 U. MiAMI L. REv. 345, 348 n.26 (1961). It has also been suggested
that the Internal Revenue Code be amended to provide that bankruptcy, like
death, terminates the taxable year. See Fournier v. Rosenblum, supra note 15, at
527 n.3; 110 U. PA. L. REv. 275, 280-81 (1961). But there would still be a question whether a prospective claim would be transferable prior to bankruptcy. Any
deficiencies in the bankruptcy law should be corrected by direct amendment to
the Bankruptcy Act and not by amendment of the Internal Revenue Code.
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This amendment should be curative insofar as tax refund claims
are concerned. 63 But the Palmer case 4 indicates that a broader amendment may be in order. The lesson to be learned from the Sussman
and Palmer decisions is that the bankrupt should not benefit from
the very circumstance that caused his bankruptcy. Suppose an individual is rendered bankrupt by a large judgment against him. He may
later recoup from his insurance carrier because of the insurer's negligent failure to settle. If the creditor cannot reach the bankrupt's recoupment, the bankrupt is made practically whole, but unpaid creditors are limited in recourse to the bankrupt's assets at the time of
bankruptcy.
It is suggested that an amendment should cover the Sussman,
Palmer, and other situations, perhaps through use of such language
as the following:65
The trustee shall be vested with title to such refund claims as
may be vested in the bankrupt at the time of the petition, or
as may vest in the bankrupt subsequent to the filing of the
petition provided that such subsequently arising claims shall
be due to losses incurred by the bankrupt during the tax year
in which the petition is filed or shall be due to rights of action
accruing after bankruptcy because of payments made or obligations incurred before bankruptcy.
Implicit in the use of such broad language is the realization that
judicial refinement is inescapable even when narrowly phrased language is employed. Such refinement is desirable so long as it proceeds
from a broad base. It seems possible that section 70 (a) was too narrowly drawn at its inception. The Sussman and Fournier courts
might have reached different results had those courts felt the language
of section 70 (a) was broad enough to give them the power to act.
The Fifth Circuit should be commended for its Segal decision, and it
63. The author of the proposed amendment noted that it would vest the trustee
with the right to a refund on losses incurred subsequent to the petition, within
the tax year of the filing of the petition. This is felt to be necessary in order
to prevent the bankrupt from starting a new activity or enterprise within the
same tax year and forcing his old creditors to underwrite the losses incurred in
the initial stages of the new enterprise. 16 U. MIAtI L. REV. 345, 348 (1961). If the
refund were apportioned, as mentioned in the text at note 40, a calendar year
taxpayer could file a petition in bankruptcy as early as January 2, thereby entitling the trustee to a relatively small proportionate share of losses that might
occur throughout that tax year.
64. Palmer v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra note 18.
65. The National Bankruptcy Conference (1963) considered a proposed
amendment of §70 (a) (6) to cover rights of action accruing after bankruptcy because of payments made before bankruptcy. This writer has been unable to determine the current disposition of that proposal.
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should be said that the Sussman and Fournier courts admirably
pointed out that their judicious convictions, which are certainly
reasonable convictions, led them to a decision contrary to the policy
of the Bankruptcy Act because they felt the act was inadequate to
cope with the situation that had arisen. Congress should amend section 70 (a) in order to eliminate those inadequacies.
ROBERT
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